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BURDEN OF LOSS AND INSURANCE
Perhaps the most debated question in the law of vendor and pur-
chaser is that of the allocation of the burden of loss'51 between the
parties in cases where the contract does not specifically provide for the
matter. This question may arise in a variety of ways. The most usual
form of loss encountered in the cases is that resulting from fire which
destroys buildings or other structures on the land contracted to be
sold, 5- but injury to the premises by flood,'53 windstorm,'" or collapse
of buildings due to natural causes," 5 raises the same question. In no
reported case does the land contracted to be sold appear to have been
physically destroyed, 56 but there are numerous cases in which the
premises have been taken by eminent domain, 1"7 leaving only a claim to
a money award. It is of course possible for the parties to agree that
the burden of loss occurring after the making of the contract of sale and
before conveyance shall fall on one or the other of them,'5 8 or to make
a similar agreement as to any particular type of loss;"' and the common
*Continued from 44 YALE L. J. 559.
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151. Commonly referred to as the "risk of loss." The question arises only where the
loss, as between the parties, is accidental or fortuitous. When it results from the intentional
or negligent conduct of one of the parties, the loss falls on that party. Thus, the vendor In
possession is liable for active waste even though the "risk of loss" is on the purchaser.
See Worrall v. Munn, 53 N. Y. 185 (1875), aff'g 38 N. Y. 137 (1868). As to losses due
to the negligence of a party, see note 178, infra. As to permissive waste by the vendor
in possession, compare Royal Bristol Permanent Bldg. Soc. v. Bomash, 35 Ch. D. 390, 397
(1887), with Hellreigel v. Manning, 97 N. Y. 56, 61 (1884). And see Note (1935) 48
HARV. L. REV. 821.
152. As in Paine v. Meller, 6 Ves. 349 (Ch. 1801); Rhomberg v. Zapf, 201 Iowa 928,
208 N. W. 276 (1926); McGinley v. Forrest, 107 Neb. 309, 186 N. W. 74 (1921); Appleton
Electric Co. v. Rogers, 200 Wis. 331, 228 N. W. 505 (1930).
153. As in Neponsit Realty Co. v. Judge, 106 Misc. 445, 176 N. Y. Supp. 133 (Sup. Ct.
1919); Amundson v. Severson, 41 S. D. 377, 170 N. W. 633 (1919).
154. As in Pellegrino v. Giuliani, 118 Misc. 329, 193 N. Y. Supp. 258 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
155. As in Libman v. Levenson, 236 Mass. 221, 128 N. E. 13 (1920).
156. Cf. Amundson v. Severson, 41 S. D. 377, 170 N. W. 633 (1919) (all but 30 acrea
of 120 acre tract washed away by Missouri River).
157. E.g., Summers v. Midland Co., 167 Minn. 453, 209 N. W. 323 (1926);' Relfe v.
Osmers, 252 N. Y. 320, 169 N. E. 399 (1929).
158. As in Combs v. Fisher, 3 Bibb 51 (Ky. 1813); Rhomberg v. Zapf, 201 Iowa 928,
208 N. W. 276 (1926), discussed in Note (1927) 12 IOWA L. REV. 179.
159. As in Pellegrino v. Giuliani, 118 Misc. 329, 193 N. Y. Supp. 258 (Sup. Ct. 1922)
(express provision as to loss by fire held inapplicable to loss by windstorm).
EQUITABLE CONVERSION
American forms of real estate contracts frequently contain provisions
specifically dealing with the matter, at least to some extent. 1co Such an
agreement, moreover, does not prevent equitable conversion for other
purposes. Often, however, there is no such specific provision. Sales of
real estate may be made upon open contracts;' 0' and, even in formal
contracts, it may be that no clause as to burden of loss is included. The
law must then allocate the loss in the event that one occurs. Up to the
present time, this problem of allocation has been dealt with by the courts
without statutory aid; and, in order to appraise any proposals for legis-
lative action such as will presently be discussed, a somewhat detailed
examination of the manner in which the law has been developed by the
courts without legislative assistance is necessary.
At least five different views as to the allocation of the burden of
fortuitous losses as between vendor and purchaser have been advanced,
and at least three of these have substantial support in the cases.' -
(1) The view most widely accepted is that first enunciated in Paine v.
Meller,16 3 that from the time the vendor-purchaser relation arises the
burden of loss is on the purchaser' 04 even though the vendor may be in
possession ca This view applies with strict logic the theory of equitable
160. See, e.g., the form of real estate contract prepared by the Metropolitan Title
Guaranty Company, said to be "about the most comprehensive one in te in New York
City." HANDLER, CASES ON VENDOR AND PURCHASER (1933) 83. The provision of this form
as to burden of loss is: "The risk of loss or damage . . . by fire until delivery of the deed
is assumed by the seller:' Id. at 86. There is no similar provision in the form of real
estate contract most commonly used in England, viz. THE LAw SOCIETY's Co:umous or
SALE (1934).
161. An open contract is "a contract simply ascertaining the parties, the property to he
sold and the price, and leaving the other terms to be implied by law.." 1 WILus,
VENDOR AND Pu crAsER (3d ed. 1922) 16.
162. No attempt is here made to classify in detail the decisions in the various states.
The cases are collected in Notes (1923) 22 A. L. R. 575; (1926) 41 A. L. R. 1272; (1927)
46 A. L. R. 1126. Subsequent decisions are: Ford v. Russell, 13 La. App. 390, 128 So. 310
(1930); Durham v. McCready, 129 Mle. 279, 151 AUt. 544 (1930), (1930) 79 U. or PA. L.
REV. 239; Standard Oil Co. v. Dye, 223 Mo. App. 926, 20 S. IV. (2d) 946 (1929); Persico v.
Guernsey, 129 Misc. 190, 220 N. Y. Supp. 689 (Sup. CL 1927), afPd without opinion, 222
App. Div. 719, 225 N. Y. Supp. 890 (4th Dep't, 1927), 228 App. Div. 8SO, 239 N. Y. Supp.
925 (4th Dep't, 1930); Oak Bldg. & Roofing Co. v. Susor, 32 Ohio App. 66, 166 N. E. 903
(1929). There is a good analysis of the state of the authorities in Note (1931) 29 B1c.
L. Rv. 487. As to the English law, see FRY, Sspn= PEoRPomwcn or Co:rm crs (6th
ed. 1921) §§ 909-917; 1 DART, VENvoRs AD Pu C nAsERs (8th ed. 1929) 269 et Eeq.
163. 6 Ves. 349 (Ch. 1801).
164. See Keener, The Burden of Loss as an Incident of the Right to the Specific Per-
formance of a Contract (1901) 1 CoL. L. R ,. 1; 5 Poa.anoy, EQ'rrr Jurisrnua~m c (2d
ed. 1919) § 2282; Pound, Progress of the Law, 1918-1919-Equity (1920) 33 HAxv. L. Rm,.
813, 826 et seq.
165. Brewer v. Herbert, 30 Did. 301 (1868); Reife v. Osmers. 252 N. Y. 320, 324, 169
N. E. 399, 400 (1929); Dunn v. Yakish, 10 Okla. 388, 61 Pac. 926 (1900); Maudru v.
Humphreys, 83 W. Va. 307, 311, 98 S. E. 259, 261 (1919); 1 Amm, CASES n EQurr
JumsicTioN (1901) 236, n. 1; Pound, supra note 164, at 826, n. 68.
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conversion, holding the purchaser to have "become in equity the owner
of the premises" so that "they are his to all intents and purposes.
1 0
(2) A strong minority of American jurisdictions, following an early de-
cision in Massachusetts,' 67 hold that the burden of loss is on the vendor
until legal title is conveyed,' although the purchaser is in possession.0"
These decisions proceed on the basis of common law ideas as to failure
of consideration and implied conditions, and disregard the theory of
equitable conversion' ° (3) It has been urged that the burden of loss
should be on the vendor until the time agreed upon for the conveyance of
legal title, and thereafter on the purchaser unless the vendor is then in
such default as to be unable specifically to enforce the contract; 71 but
this proposed solution of the problem has not been recognized in the
decisions. (4) It has been powerfully argued,172 and some courts have
held,"'73 that the burden of loss should be on the party in possession,
whether vendor or purchaser. The theory behind this solution of the
problem is that the purchaser in possession is substantial owner of the
property and should bear the burdens of ownership, while the purchaser
out of possession is not substantial owner; this argument is supported
by the decisions which make the right to rents and profits1 74 and the
liability for taxes'75 and other outgoings' 76 depend upon possession. 7
166. Lord Eldon, L. C., in Paine v. Meller, 6 Ves. 349, 352 (Ch. 1801).
167. Thompson v. Gould, 37 Mass. 134 (1838). This case involved an action at law
by the purchaser under an oral contract to recover a deposit, so that the actual decision
is consistent with the majority rule. Cf. Blew v. McClelland, 29 Mo, 304 (1860). But
there was a considered dictum to the effect that the same result would have been reached
in equity if the contract had been in writing, and the later Massachusetts cases have adopted
this view. See especially Libman v. Levenson, 236 Mass. 221, 128 N. E. 13 (1920).
168. See Note (1912) 12 CoL. L. REv. 257; Griffin, Risk of Loss in Executory Land Con-
tracts (1929) 4 NomRE DAwx LAWY. 506.
169. La Chance v. Brown, 41 Cal. App. 500, 183 Pac. 216 (1919); Wilson v. Clark, 60
N. H. 352 (1880).
170. But cf. Stone, Equitable Conversion by Contract (1913) 13 Coi. L, REy. 369, 385
et seq., in which the minority American view is supported on equitable grounds.
171. LAxGDELL, A BaIT SuRvTy or EQUTrY JtuIsDIcmlox (2d ed. 1908) 58 et seq.
172. Williston, The Risk of Loss after an Executory Contract of Sale in the Conitton
Law (1895) 9 HAv. L. Ray. 106, 111, et seq.; 2 WrusTor, CoNTRAcrs (1920) §§ 927-
953. See also Note (1922) 6 MsuN. L. REv. 513; (1923) 2 iVxs. L R v. 174.
173. E.g., Appleton Electric Co. v. Rogers, 200 Wis. 331, 228 N. W. 505 (1930), (1930)
14 MARQ. L. REv. 183, (1930) 5 Wis. L. Rv. 503.
174. Clark v. Richfield Oil Co., 127 Cal. App. 495, 16 P. (2d) 162 (1932); Iowa Rr.
Land Co. v. Boyle, 154 Iowa 249, 134 N. W. 590 (1912) ; Tucker v. McLaughlin-Farrar Co.,
36 Okla. 321, 129 Pac. 5 (1912).
175. National Bank of Athens v. Danforth, 80 Ga. 55, 64, 7 S. E. $46, 551 (1887); Miller
v. Corey, 15 Iowa 106, 129 Pac. 5 (1863); Millville Aerie v. Weatherby, 82 N. J. Eq. 455,
88 Atl. 847 (1913); Densmore v. Haggerty, 59 Pa. 189 (1868). For a full collection of
the decisions as to all aspects of the question of liability for taxes as between vendor and
purchaser, see Note (1921) 12 A. L. R. 411.
176. But cf. King v. Ruckman, 24 N. J. Eq. 556, 566 (1873).
177. It is not wholly clear whether the courts and legal writers adopting the possesslon
f[Vol. 44
EQUITABLE CONVERSION
Moreover, the practical argument is made that placing the burden of
loss on the party in possession will put pressure on him to protect the
property. This seems a substantial argument. To be sure, the burden
of a loss due to provable negligence falls on the negligent party regard-
less of which solution of the problem of the burden of accidental loss
be adopted; 8 but it is one thing to say that the party out of possession
may escape the burden of loss by proving affirmatively that the loss was
due to the other party's negligence, and another to place the burden of
loss on the party in possession regardless of negligence on his part.
(5) Certain recent legal writersO argue that the burden of loss should
be placed on the vendor unless there is something in the contract or in
the relation of the parties from which the court can infer a different
intention. On this theory, possession "might or might not be a sufficient
controlling element."'8 0 There has not as yet been any avowed judicial
acceptance of this rather vague test, although it is not inconsistent with
most of the decisions in the states adopting the view that the burden of
loss is on the vendor until conveyance or with those in the states adopting
the possession test.
Where the burden of loss is on the purchaser, 8 ' the vendor may
enforce specific performance of the purchaser's obligation to pay the
purchase price, 8 - while the purchaser cannot recover his deposit or any
partial payments he has made.18 3 But the contract is not avoided, and
the vendor cannot refuse to convey upon payment of the agreed price.'P
These consequences follow logically from the conception that the pur-
chaser is in equity owner of the land from the time of the contract or
of his possession thereunder, whichever the rule adopted by the par-
criterion for the allocation of the burden of loss refer to actual possession or to the right to
possession. Suppose, for enample, that possession is to be given when the contract is made
and the vendor moves out, but the purchaser does not take possession. If the rationale of
the possession test is that which has been here suggested, it would seem that the burden
of any loss under such circumstances should fall on the purchaser. Cf. Good v. Jarrard, 93
S. C. 229, 238, 76 S. E. 698, 701 (1912). Of course, if the vendor wrongfully kept the
purchaser out of possession, the result would be otherwise. Cf. Mitchell v. Blutch, 189
Iowa 1150, 179 N. W. 440 (1920).
178. See Mackey v. Bowles, 98 Ga. 730, 734, 25 S. E. 834, 836 (1896); Note (1923) 22
A. L. R. 575, 583 (loss due to negligence of vendor).
179. Vanneman, Risk of Loss, in Equity, between the Date of Contract to Sell Real
Estate and Transfer of Title (1924) 8 Mlnn. L. REv. 127; Note (1920) 6 Con,. L. Q. 111;
(1930) 79 U. or PA. L. REv. 239.
180. Vanneman, supra note 179, at 143.
181. Either because the vendor-purchaser relation has arisen (the majority view) or
because the purchaser is in possession (Williston's theory).
182. E.g., Paine v. Mfeller, 6 Ves. 349 (Ch. 1801).
183. E.g., Pellegrino v. Guiliani, 118 Mlisc. 329, 193 N. Y. Supp 288 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
Prior to legislation allowing equitable defenses in legal actions, a contrary result would
have been reached at law; but equity would have enjoined the action at law.
184. A purchaser might well desire to enforce specific performance in spite of the los
if the market value of the land had risen substantially.
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ticular court may be. Where the burden of loss is on the vendor under
the Massachusetts rule, he is not entitled to specific performance against
the purchaser for the purchase price if there has been substantial 8
accidental damage to the premises, 86 and the purchaser can recover his
deposit and any partial payments. 81 7  It may be, however, that the
purchaser desires specifically to enforce the contract with compensation
for the damage. The Massachusetts court in Hawkes v. Keloe 88 in-
dicated that the purchaser would not be entitled to such relief,18 since
"the contract is to be construed as subject to the implied condition that
it no longer shall be binding if, before the time for the conveyance to be
made, the buildings are destroyed... ."10 This is a complete rejection of
the conception that the purchaser has a property interest in the premises,
and, while consistent with the Massachusetts rule as to risk of loss, is
open to the serious objection that it gives the vendor an option to avoid
the contract which it is doubtful that the parties intended to give him.
It would logically follow, moreover, that the vendor could refuse to
convey in such a case even though the purchaser tendered the full pur-
chase price.191 It would seem, therefore, that specific performance with
compensation to the purchaser should be allowed, even in those juris-
dictions which place the burden of loss on the vendor until conveyance, 1 2
provided that the usual requirements for partial performance with
compensation are met. Where the possession test is adopted and the
burden of loss is on the vendor because possession has not yet been
taken by the purchaser,'93 or where the "risk of loss"1" 4 is on the vendor
185. If the damage is not substantial, the vendor may be able to enforce specific per-
formance with compensation to the purchaser for the damage, as in Capital Savings &
Loan Ass'n v. Convey, 175 Wash. 224, 27 P. (2d) 136 (1933). Cf. Bautz v. Kuhworth, 1
Mont. 133, 135 (1869).
186. E.g., Libman v. Levenson, 236 Mass. 221, 128 N. E. 13 (1920).
187. E.g., Wilson v. Clark, 60 N. H. 352 (1880).
188. 193 Mass. 419, 79 N. E. 766 (1907).
189. The actual decision in Hawkes v. Kehoe was that the purchaser could not recover
damages from the vendor for his failure to perform under such circumstances.
190. Hawkes v. Kehoe, 193 Mass. 419, 425, 79 N. E. 766, 767 (1907).
191. In Hallett v. Parker, 68 N. H. 598, 39 Atl. 433 (1896), a purchaser who had paild
the purchase price in full was granted specific performance although the buildings on the
land had been destroyed by fire subsequent to the making of the contract. Cf. Wilson v.
Clark, 60 N. H. 352 (1880), holding that under such circumstances the purchaser can re-
cover partial payments made prior to the loss. It seems very doubtful whether even the
Massachusetts court would follow the theory of Hawkes v. Kehoe to the logical extreme
of denying specific relief to a purchaser who offered to pay the full price regardless of the
loss.
192. See the comment on Hawkes v. Kehoe in Note (1907) 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 125.
193. As in Phinizy v. Guernsey, 111 Ga. 346, 36 S. E. 796 (1900).
194. Cf. the form of real estate contract quoted supra note 160.
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by express contract stipulation,'"5 this conclusion is even more clearly
indicated.' It has been held1 97 that partial performance with com-
pensation will be denied the purchaser where "it can not be... said...
that the parties would have contracted for the remnant of the property,
with an abatement of purchase price, had they anticipated . . . [the]
loss," since in such cases the loss "sustained is [not] capable of com-
putation" and to grant such relief would be "to make for the parties a
new contract---one not contemplated in their original negotiations.
19 3
This view seems unsound. It is true that partial specific performance
with compensation will be denied where the amount of compensation
cannot be fairly assessed,"0 but there seems no substantial difficulty in
determining the amount to be abated from the purchase price in respect
of physical damage to the premises.0 0 The suggestion that equity will
not make over the contract seems beside the point; whatever may be
said as to the basis of the doctrine of partial performance with compen-
sation in other cases,20" what equity is doing when it grants such relief
after an injury to the property while at the risk of the vendor is simply
allowing specific relief so far as possible, with damages in the same suit
for the vendor's failure to perform completely.- -
Any practical consideration of the problem of burden of loss as between
vendor and purchaser must take account of the matter of insurance. Most
cases of damage to real property contracted to be sold involve fire
195. As in Polisiuk v. Mayers, 205 App. Div. 573, 200 N. Y. Supp. 97 (2d Dep't, 1923),
leave to appeal denied, 206 App. Div. 765 (2d Dep't, 1923). This would appear to be the
nule even in Massachusetts. Allyn v. Allyn, 154 Mass. 570, 28 N. E. 779 (1891); Hawkes
v. Kehoe, 193 Mass. 419, 425, 79 N. E. 766, 767 (1907); cf. Kares v. Covell, 180 Mas-s. 205,
208, 62 N. E. 244, 245 (1902).
196. This result has also been reached where the burden of loss is on the vendor because
he has not yet perfected title. Eppstein v. Kuhn, 225 II. 115, 125, 80 N. E. SO, 83 (1907).
197. Wheeler v. Gahan, 206 Ky. 366, 267 S. W. 227 (1924). But cf. Godfrey v. Alcorn,
215 Ky. 465, 284 S. W. 1094 (1926), (1926) 24 Micin. L. REv. 838, distinguishing WJeder
zv. Gahan on what would appear to be the untenable ground that there the purchaser had only
an option when the loss occurred. In view of the decision in Godfrey v. Alcorn, it may be
doubted whether Wheeler v. Gahan would now be followved in Kentucky.
198. Wheeler v. Gahan, 206 Ky. 366, 371, 267 S. W. 227, 229 (1924).
199. Rudd v. Lascelles, [1900] 1 Ch. 815; Brisbane v. Sullivan, 86 N. J. Eq. 411, 99
At. 197 (1916).
200. See Phinizy v. Guernsey, 111 Ga. 346, 354, 36 S. E. 796, 799 (1900) (stating the
principles to be applied in determining compensation in such a case). There is les
difficulty in assessing compensation here than there is in some other cases where compensa-
tion is allowed, as, e.g., Barnes v. Wood, 8 Eq. 424 (1869) (vendor contracting to sell
the fee owned only an estate pur autre vie with a possibility of tenancy by the curtesy);
Moore v. Gariglietti, 228 Ill. 143, 81 N. E. 826 (1907) (vendor owned only undivided two-
fifths interest); Note (1927) 46 A. L. R. 748, 750 (compensation for inchoate right of
dower).
201. Cf. Note (1912) 25 HARv. L. Rav. 731; Note (1926) 4 T. L. Ray. 376.
202. Cf. Note (1927) 40 HARv. L. Rv. 476.
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losses20 3 which may be, and ordinarily are, insured against. Decision of
where the burden of fire loss shall fall as between vendor and pur-
chaser is important in determining both how insurance against fire is to
be effected and how insurance money received by a party to the contract
is to be distributed." 4 At least five problems arise in this connection:
(1) Has the vendor or purchaser an insurable interest in the premises
contracted to be sold? (2) Has the vendor or purchaser an exclusive
ownership or interest within the meaning of the usual condition in fire
insurance policies requiring the interest of the insured to be that of
"unconditional and sole ownership" or the like? (3) Does the making
of the contract or possession by the purchaser thereunder bring about
such a change of "interest, title or possession" as to avoid insurance
theretofore taken out? (4) Is the purchaser entitled to claim insurance
money received by the vendor? (5) Can the vendor require the pur-
chaser to apply insurance money received by the latter in payment of
the purchase price?
The vendor under a land contract has an insurable interest in the
premises regardless of what view is taken as to the burden of loss. If
the burden is on him,20 he has the same insurable interest as any owner.
If the burden is on the purchaser, but the vendor has not been paid in
full, he has a security interest in the premises which is clearly insur-
able;2 6 .and even if he has been paid, there is no reason, so far as the
doctrine of insurable interest is concerned, why he cannot procure insur-
ance on the property as trustee for the purchaser.0 ' Until the contract
is made, the purchaser has, of course, no insurable interest; but once
it is made, he can insure his interest20 regardless of whether the burden
of loss is on him or not. His "equitable title to ... [the] property
constitutes a good insurable interest therein.) 20 9
The New York standard fire policy contains a clause of avoidance
"if the interest of the insured be other than unconditional and sole
ownership," unless otherwise provided by a written endorsement upon
the policy.210 This clause does not, of course, affect insurance taken out
203. See, however, notes 153-155, supra.
204. The same principles would be applicable to other insured losses; and cases Involving,
e.g., tornado insurance, may well arise.
205. As it is until conveyance on the Massachusetts view or until the purchaser takes
possession under the possession test urged by Williston.
206. VANCE, INsuRANca (2d ed. 1930) 128 and n. 44.
207. Cf. (Howard Fire] Insurance Co. v. Chase, 5 Wall. 509, 513 (U. S. 1866); RicnADs,
INSURANCE (4th ed. 1932) § 26. It may be necessary, however, for the vendor to disclose
the facts in order effectively to insure under these circumstances. Cf. note 216, infra.
208. RiCHARDs, INSURANCR (4th ed. 1932) § 27, n. 32 (collecting cases),
209. R CHARDs, INsuRANCE (4th ed. 1932) 41.
210. Lines 20-23 of the standard fire insurance policy of New York, reprinted In
RIcuRDs, INsURANCE (4th ed. 1932) 935. This form of policy is prescribed verbatim In
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by the vendor prior to making the contract of sale,' 1 but it may affect
insurance taken out by vendor or purchaser thereafter. The decisions
on the effect of the clause are numerous,- 1- and for the most part reach
results consistent with the proposition that the party to a land contract
upon ivhom the burden of loss will fall in the event that the premises
are damaged by fire is unconditional and sole owner within the meaning
of the policy provision.213  The party who does not bear the burden of
loss, on the other hand, may not insure as unconditional and sole
owner.2 14  This result is entirely in accord with the theory of equitable
conversion and with the doctrine of insurance law that the interest of
the insured, in order to satisfy the unconditional and sole ownership
clause, must be such "that the substantial burden of any fire loss Will
fall exclusively upon him, regardless of the technical character of his
title.12 15  Under modern forms of policy, if the insured is "unconditional
and sole" owner, it is not necessary that the precise character of his
interest be stated.216
some six states, and is followed in substance in many others. As to the old New York
standard form, still in use in several states, see note 216, infra. For the fMachuetts
standard form, used in four states, see PAlrERso'., CAsEs o,; Izrsurwc (1932) 792 et seq.
211. The clause applies only to conditions existing when the policy is taken out and not
to changes in title thereafter. See VA-CE, IxsuRAnc C (2d ed. 1930) 703, n. 70.
212. These decisions to 1929 are collected and ably analyzed in Note (1929) 0 A. L. R.
11.
213. VANcE, INsURANcE (2d ed. 1930) 708. It is frequently said by courts and text-
writers that the purchaser is unconditional and sole owner when he has taken posession
under the contract. But, as pointed out in Note (1929) 60 A. L. R. 11, 21, possession
should make no difference unless it affects the allocation of the burden of loss between
the parties to the contract. There appears to be no decision taking a contrary view. As
to decisions in Georgia, Illinois and Missouri to the effect that the purchaser does not have
"unconditional and sole ownership" unless he has p3id the entire purchase price, sea Note
(1929) 60 A. L. R. 11, 26 et seq. These decisions appear to result from the failure of the
courts of those states to apply the theory of equitable conversion by contract unless the
purchaser had paid in full, and must be regarded as inconsistent with the principles of
classical equity as to when conversion takes place.
214. The actual decisions holding vendors under land contracts not to have "uncon-
ditional and sole ownership" all appear to have involved possession by the purchaser. See
Note (1929) 60 A. L. R. 11, 48. But this should not necessarily be decisive, nor chould the
fact that the purchaser has or has not paid the purchase price. Cf. note 213, supra. De-
cisions like National Fire Ins. Co. v. Three States Lumber Co., 217 Ill. 115, 75 N. E. 450
(1905), indicating that the vendor is unconditional and sole owner until he has been paid
in full, must be regarded as local singularities.
215. R cHcAxs, LssuxNc (4th ed. 1932) 372.
216. The old (1887) form of New York standard fire policy (lines 8-9) contained a
clause avoiding the policy "if the interest of the insured in the policy be not truly stated
therein.' VAwcn, IssuRacn (2d ed. 1930) 707. This old New York form, which is still in
use in some seven states, is reprinted in PAmasoNr, CASES Owi L';suRANcn (1932) 786 et seq.
Cf. Wooliver v. Boylston Ins. Co., 104 Aich. 232, 62 N. W. 3S1 (1895).
Under the present standard New York form (lines 25-26), the policy is avoided, unles3
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Where the premises contracted to be sold have been insured by the
vendor prior to the making of contract, the question arises whether the
contract effects a change of interest, title or possession within the
meaning of the clause in the standard policy avoiding the insurance "if
any change, other than by the death of" a party, "take place in the
interest, title or possession of the subject of insurance (except change
of occupants without increase of risk) ,217 unless otherwise provided by
written agreement endorsed upon the policy. If the problem be ap-
proached as one of construing the words of the policy according to their
natural meaning, it would seem that whether or not a contract of sale or
a transfer of possession thereunder avoids insurahce previously taken
out by the vendor should depend upon whether or not the burden of loss
has shifted from vendor to purchaser in consequence of the contract or
the transfer of possession.218 If the making of the contract shifts the
burden of loss, so that the vendor, if he were insuring anew, could no
longer properly describe himself as "unconditional and sole" owner, 10
there would seem to be a "change of interest" as a result of the contract.
If the taking of possession under the contract shifts the burden of loss,
then the contract coupled with the purchaser's possession should have a
similar effect. But if the burden of loss remains on the vendor, a taking
of possession by the purchaser would seem to fall within the exception as
to "change of occupants without increase of hazard." There is, how-
ever, another standpoint from which the problem may be approached.
As has forcefully been pointed out:
"Valuable buildings are usually insured by many policies. Conveyancing
for the most part follows a well established practice. A preliminary or execu-
tory contract of sale is exchanged, with part payment by the vendee, and an
obligation on both sides to complete at a given date, but only provided, upon
examination, the title is found as represented....
Where the contract is silent upon the subject, courts differ as to whether the
executory vendee must complete despite the intermediate destruction of the
building by fire. But however that issue may be determined, it is obviously of
great importance to the public to know at what precise stage of such a trans-
action numerous subsisting policies of the vendor ought in due course to be
cancelled, and new policies taken out, or indorsement made on the old, in
favor of the vendee. Convenience seems to demand that whether or not the
otherwise provided by written endorsement, if the subject of the insurance be a building on
ground not owned by the insured in fee simple. Cf. note 210, supra. A purchaser of tile fee
simple who is in possession under a contract of purchase is, by the weight of authority, an
owner in fee simple within the meaning of this clause. See Note (1929) 60 A. L. R. 11, 15.
Here again it would appear that possession is material only in so far as it affects burden of
loss.
217. New York standard fire policy, lines 28-31, reprinted in RxIcARnS, INsUafcE (4th
ed. 1932) 935.
218. VANCE, INsURANcE (2d ed. 1930) 719. 219. See note 213, supra.
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vendee takes out insurance to protect his interest, the subsisting policies of the
vendor should continue in full force and effect until the deed of conveyance is
delivered and title transferred." -0
Approaching the problem in this manner, and construing the standard
policy so as to harmonize "with the exigencies of trade,"2'' it may be
urged that the vendor's insurance is not avoided by the making of the
contract to sell even though the burden of loss shifts to the purchaser
when the contract is made, at least so long as the vendor remains unpaid,
especially in view of the settled principle that a contract of insurance
is to be construed most strongly against the insurer. -"  But where the
purchaser takes possession, there is no compelling commercial necessity
for construing the policy so as to avoid the termination of the vendor's
insurance, since such a transaction is commonly considered by the parties
as a real transfer of interest. The interaction of conflicting doctrines
as to burden of loss and conflicting views as to the proper approach to
the problem of insurance law presented in this situation has resulted in
much confusion in the decisions. The prevailing view is that the making
of a contract of sale will not of itself avoid the vendor's insurance under
the "change of interest, title or possession" clause, but that such insur-
ance will be avoided if the purchaser takes possession under the con-
tract.2 There are, however, decisions that the mere making of the
contract avoids the vendor's policies, -2 2 4 and, on the other hand, that even
possession by the purchaser under the contract will not have this effectY
Uniformity on this important matter can, it would seem, be attained
only by appropriate specific modifications of the statutory standard fire
policies.
Where a vendor collects insurance money for a loss occurring subse-
quent to the making of the contract of sale,2 2 01 the matter of burden of
220. Ricmrs~s, INsuRAncE (4th ed. 1932) 384 (footnotes omitted).
221. Ibid. 222. Id. at 114 et seq.
223. VANcE, IxsuRAxcE (2d ed. 1930) 719; RiCHEDS, I SUR, cE (4th ed. 1932) § 245;
PATrERSON, CASES ON INSuRANcE (1932) 180; Note (1929) 60 A. L. R. 11, 52 et seq. Cf.
Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 2 F. (2d) 651, 654 (C. C. A. 3d, 1924), where it
was held that the making of a contract which expressly provided that the burden of loss
should be on the vendor until conveyance did not avoid the vendor's insurance, where the
purchaser had not taken possession under the contract.
224. Win. Skinner & Sons' Ship-Building & Dry-Dock Co. v. Houghton, 92 Md. 65, 92,
48 Atl. 85, 89 (1900) ; Manning v. North British & Mercantile Ins. Co., 123 Mo. App. 456,
99 S. W. 1095 (1907).
225. Budelman v. American Ins. Co., 297 Ill. 222, 130 N. E. 513 (1921); Garner v.
Milwaukee Mechanics' Ins. Co., 73 Kan. 127, 84 Pac. 717 (1906); Trichel v. Home Ins.
Co., 155 La. 459, 99 So. 403 (1924).
226. The usual situation is that where the vendor was insured prior to the contract and
the loss is paid to him either because his policy is held not to be avoided by the contract
1935]
764 YALE LAW JOURNAL Il& 44
loss as between the parties to the contract is an important factor in deter-
mining how the money so received is to be disposed of. Where the
burdesi of loss is on the vendor, this problem is easily dealt with. The
loss is the vendor's, and the indemnity for that loss which he receives
from the insurer is likewise his; the purchaser, although he is entitled,
to the return of his deposit, or may, if he so elects, be able to enforce
partial specific performance with compensation, 21 has no claim to the
insurance money.228 Where, however, the burden of loss is on the
purchaser, a much more difficult problem is presented. In the leading
case of Rayner v. Preston,229 the Court of Appeal held, over the vigorous
dissent of James, L. J., that the purchaser was not entitled either to
claim the insurance money received by the vendor or to have it applied
to the repair of the damaged premises, and, in Castellain v. Preston,230
that the vendor must refund the insurance money to the insurer, on the
theory of subrogation. 23 1  From the standpoint of technical insurance
law, this result is quite correct. -32 A contract of fire insurance is a con-
tract of indemnity. It insures, not the property, but the interest of the
insured in the property. In the case of the vendor, what is insured is
his security interest; if he collect in full from the purchaser, he has
(cf. notes 223-225, supra) or because the insurer does not raise the defense of change of
interest. Cf. Win. Skinner & Sons' Ship-Building & Dry-Dock Co. v. Houghton, 92 Md.
68, 97, 48 Atl. 85, 91 (1900).
227. See notes 192-196, supra.
228. Phinizy v. Guernsey, 111 Ga. 346, 349, 36 S. E. 796, 797 (1900). The same result
was reached in Brownell v. Board of Education, 239 N. Y. 369, 146 N. E. 630 (1925),
although on rather confused reasoning, the court discussing the case as if it were one where
the burden of loss was on the purchaser and purporting to follow Rayner v. Preston, 18
Ch. D. 1 (1881), infra note 229. In Appleton Electric Co. v. Rogers, 200 Wis. 331, 228
N. W. 505 (1930), (1930) 5 Wis. L. REv. 503, where the insurance money received by the
vendor exceeded the contract price, the purchaser, who paid the contract price in full after
the loss, was denied relief in a suit to compel payment to him of the insurance money. In
so far as this case indicates inferentially that the purchaser would not have been entitled to
specific performance with compensation if he had taken appropriate proceedings to that end,
it seems supportable only on the theory that the contract involved (for the sale, for $30,000,
of land worth $10,000 and buildings appraised for insurance purposes at $388,000, for dam-
age to which $113,667 had been collected by the vendor) was so unfair and so improvident
on the vendor's part as not to be specifically enforceable at all. Cf. Higgins v. Butter, 78
Me. 520,7 Atl. 276 (1886); 5 Pommoy, op. cit. supra note 164, at § 2211; Note (1930) 65
A. L. R. 7, 75 et seq. In Phinizy v. Guernsey, supra, specific performance with compen.a-
tion was granted the purchaser although he was held not to be entitled to insurance money
received by the vendor. See also Note (1925) 10 CoRN. L. Q. 379, 381.
229. 18 Ch. D. 1 (1881).
230. 11 Q. B. D. 380 (1883), rev'g 8 Q. B. D. 613 (1882).
231. Cf. Rxncmuws, INsuRAcE (4th ed. 1932) § 54; VANcE, INs R cE (2d ed. 1930)
669 et seq.; (1930) 5 WXs. L. REv. 503, 507 et seq.
232. See Brownell v. Board of Education, 239 N. Y. 369, 374, 146 N. E. 630, 632 (1925);
Pound, supra note 164, at 829, n. 78; RiCuARDS, INsuRANcE (4th ed. 1932) 69.
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suffered no loss and the insurance company should not be required to
pay, while if he collect from the insurer rather than proceed against the
purchaser, the insurer is entitled to subrogation to his rights against the
purchaser under the contract. Hence, as between vendor, purchaser and
insurer, the loss will eventually fall on the purchaser. But this result,
although it may be "law," -" does not at all "savor of layman's views of
equity," and disregards "the meaning of the [insurance] transaction in
the market place."2 4  In business practice, the insurance money is
thought of as substituted for the insured property; the insurance is
regarded as being "on the buildings," not simply on the vendor's security
interest in the buildings. Moreover, to allow the insurer to escape paying
a fire loss simply because the vendor has agreed to sell the insured
property appears, to the layman at least, to give the insurer a wholly
unmerited windfall. There has been no uncontemplated change of
risk; 25 the insurance company is paying exactly the sort of loss it agreed
to pay-why should it be allowed t9 shift the loss it has contracted to
bear onto the unfortunate purchaser?" Such arguments as these have
prevailed in most American courts to which the question has been
presented," 7 and the purchaser has been allowed the benefit of the
vendor's fire insurance where the burden of loss was upon the purchaser
at the time of the fire.-z  In England, moreover, similar arguments have
233. Brownell v. Board of Education, 239 N. Y. 369, 374, 146 N. E. 630, 632 (1925).
234. [Vance] Comment (1924) 34 YAr.x L. J. 87, 90.
235. Unless the making of the contract amounts to a forbidden "change of interest,
title or possession" (cf. notes 223-225, suprar), in which event the policy is avoided.
236. On the other hand, it may be argued that the purchaser gets an unmerited wind-
fall if he is allowed the advantage of insurance which he did not take out and of which he
may not even have known.
237. The strongest American authority in accord with Rayner v. Preston is a carefully
considered dictum in Brownell v. Board of Education, 239 N. Y. 369, 372, 146 N. E. 630,
631 (1925), (1925) 25 COL. L. REv. 477, (1925) 10 CoRY. L. Q. 379. The decision in King
v. Preston, 11 La. Ann. 95 (1856), can no longer be regarded as authority to that effect.
See Automatic Sprinkler Corp. v. Robinson-Slagle Lumber Co., 147 So. 542, 544 (La.
App. 1933). But there are intimations in accord with Rayner v. Preston in Kortlander v.
Elston, 52 Fed. 180, 185 (C. C. A. 6th, 1892); White v. Gilman, 138 Cal. 375, 71 Pac. 436
(1903); Remington v. Sabin, 132 Minn. 372, 157 N. W. 504 (1916); Plimpton v. Farmer's
Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 43 Vt. 497 (1871).
238. See Brady v. Welsh, 200 Iowa 44, 204 N. W. 235 (1925), (1925) 11 IowA L. Rv.
73, (1925) 35 Y=.a L. J. 240; Win. Skinner & Sons' Ship-Building & Dry-Dock v.
Houghton, 92 Md. 68, 48 AtL 85 (1900), (1901) 15 HAnv. L. Rv. 160; Standard Oil Co. v.
Dye, 223 Mo. App. 926, 20 S. W. (2d) 946 (1929), (1930) 7 N. Y. U. L. Q. REy. 754;
McGinley v. Forrest, 107 Neb. 309, 186 N. W. 74 (1921); Milville Aerie v. Weatherby, 82
N. 3. Eq. 455, 457, 88 At. 847, 848 (1913); Peck v. Hale, 11 Ohio App. 418 (1919); Rus-enl
v. Elliott, 45 S. D. 184, 186 N. W. 824 (1922); VcE, Izzsum';ca (2d ed. 1930) 659 et
seq. Some courts have even gone so far as to hold an optionee entitled, upon exercising his
option to purchase, to insurance money received by the optionor in respect of a loS oc-
curring after the option was given. See Dolan v. Spencer, 92 Colo. 389. 21 P. (2d) 411
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resulted in the attempted statutory modification of the'rule of Rayner v.
Preston. The Law of Property Act, 1922, provided that any insurance
money becoming payable to the vendor should, unless otherwise provided
by the contract of sale, "be held or receivable by the vendor on behalf
of the purchaser" and paid by the vendor to the purchaser accordingly. " "
As this provision finally came into force,240 however, it has effect only
"subject to . . . any requisite consents of the insurers";2 and the
addition of these innocent-appearing words appears as a practical matter
to have nullified the provision almost completely.242 Unless the insurer
has consented that the purchaser shall have the advantage of the vendor's
insurance, the statutory provision does not apply and "the vendor wil
be entitled, as between himself and the purchaser, to retain the insurance
money.) 243
As between the parties to the contract of sale, the purchaser may be
(1933); Williams v. Liley, 67 Conn. 50, 34 At. 765 (1895); Peoples St. Ry. Co. v. Spencer,
156 Pa. 85, 27 Atl. 113 (1893) ; Schnee v. Elston, 299 Pa. 100, 149 Atl. 108 (1930), (1930)
78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 791. This seems clearly unsound, for two quite independent reasons:
(1) Even though there is a binding contract, the purchaser cannot claim insurance money
received by the vendor where the burden of loss is on the vendor, although the purchaser
is entitled to specific performance with compensation for the loss. Phinizy v. Guernsey,
111 Ga. 346, 36 S. E. 796 (1900). Cf. note 228, supra. (2) In the case of an option, the
optionee is not even entitled to specific performance with compensation. Caldwell v.
Frazier, 65 Kan. 24, 68 Pac. 1076 (1902); Gamble v. Garlock, 116 Minn. 59, 133 N. W.
175 (1911). The substantial weight of authority does not permit the optionce, by
exercising the option, to take advantage of the optionor's insurance. Edwards v. West,
7 Ch. D. 858 (1878); Trumbell v. Bombard, 171 App. Div. 700, 157 N. Y. Supp. 794 (3d
Dep't, 1916), aff'd without opinion, 225 N. Y. 638, 121 N. E. 895 (1919); Gilbert & Ives
v. Port, 28 Ohio St. 276 (1876) ; Strong v. Moore, 105 Ore. 12, 24, 207 Pac. 179, 183 (1922) ;
Rice v. Crump, 5 Tenn. Civ. App. 146 (1914); Clark v. Burr, 85 Wis. 649, 55 N. W, 401
(1893). The result may be otherwise if the option contract provides that the optionee
shall have the benefit of the vendor's insurance. See Carnation Lumber & Shingle Co. v.
Tolt Land Co., 103 Wash. 633, 642, 175 Pac. 331, 334 (1918). Some of the decisions
which allow the optionee to reach the optionor's insurance money may perhaps be sustained
on the theory of an implied contract of this sort.
239. 12 & 13 Gao. V., c. 16, § 105 (1922).
240. As § 47 (1) of the LAw or PRoPrTY AcT, 1925, 15 GEo. V., c. 20, (1925).
Most of the provisions of the Law of Property Act 1922, including Section 105, never
came into actual effect, being superseded, prior to the effective date of the Act, by the English
property legislation of 1925. See RADcL=, REAL PROPERTY LAw (1933) 202.
241. 15 Gao. V, c. 20, § 47 (2) (b) (1925). The securing of such consents "is usually
a mere matter of form." Note (1929) 73 SoL. J. 564. But failure to secure them may
have very serious consequences. See notes 242-243, infra.
242. See Note (1927) 164 L. T. 502; Giasox, CONvEYANciNo (13th ed. 1928) 105 et seq.;
Note (1929) 73 SoL. J. 564; CHEsB=, MoDEm LAw OF REAL PROPERTV (3d ed, 1933)
647, n. 1.
243. GmsoN, CoNvEYANCnco (13th ed. 1928) 106. This has not always been realized
by American commentators. See, e.g., (1930) 7 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 754, 755.
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given the benefit of the vendor's insurance by agreement.24 But if the
vendor assigns his policy to the purchaser without the consent of the
insurer, it will become void for violation of the clause against assignment
before loss;245 and if the vendor agrees to give the purchaser the benefit
of his insurance but does not assign the policy, he runs the risk of having
to repay to the insurer any amount which is paid to the purchaser under
this agreement.2 46  These difficulties are eliminated, of course, if the
insurer assents to the assignment or agreement.
The purchaser, once the contract is made, has an insurable interest in
the property,247 and may and frequently does insure. If a loss occurs,
any insurance which the purchaser collects under a policy insuring his
interest belongs to him free of any claim of the vendor.18 Where, how-
ever, the purchaser, pursuant to the contract, insures the property with
loss payable to vendor and purchaser "as interest may appear," the
vendor is entitled to the insurance money to the extent of payments due
on the purchase price,24 or, if no payments are due, can require such
money either to be applied to the restoration of the premises' ° or held as
security for the unpaid portion of the price,251 as the purchaser may
elect.252  This method of insuring, which is that ordinarily employed
where the relation of the parties is that of mortgagor and mortgagee, is
244. E.g., Zenor v. Hayes, 228 11L 626, 81 N. E. 1144 (1907) (assignment of vendor's
policy to purchaser).
245. Line 31 of the New York standard fire policy, reprinted in RPcHns, Insimuzme
(4th ed. 1932) 935. As to the construction of this clause, see id. at § 248.
246. Cf. West of England Fire Ins. Co. v. Isaacs, [1897] 1 Q. B. 226; Phoenix Assurance
Co. v. Spooner, [1905] 2 K. B. 753; 1 DART, Vx-sDoas Ao Pu cmsEsns (6th ed. 18S3) 195
et seq., 2 id. at 913 et seq. But see Godfrey v. Alcorn, 215 Ky. 465, 284 S. W. 1094 (1926).
247. See note 20S, supra.
248. Hammer v. Johnson, 44 Il. 192, 193 (1867); Goodin & Barney Coal Co. v.
Southern Elkhorn Coal Co., 219 Ky. 827, 832, 294 S. W. 792, 794 (1927); Gasmway v.
Browning, 175 S. W. 481, 482 (Teax. Civ. App. 1915).
249. Fanning v. Equitable Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 46 Ill. App. 215 (1892). In Grange
Mill Co. v. Western Assurance Co., 118 IlL 396, 9 N. E. 274 (1886), the same result 'as
reached where the purchaser had agreed to insure for the vendor's benefit and, after insur-
ing the premises in his own name, became insolvent.
250. Hatch v. Commerce Ins. Co., 216 Iowa 860, 249 N. W. 164 (1933), (1933) 19
IowA L. REv. 129.
251. Scott v. Crinnian, 43 Ont. L. R. 430, 433 (1918). Even though the purchase
price be not yet due, the vendor may be entitled to have the insurance money applied
thereon, if the contract of sale so provides. Dysart v. Colonial Fire Underwriters, 142
Wash. 601, 609, 254 Pac. 240, 243 (1927).
252. Hatch v. Commerce Ins. Co., 216 Iowa 850, 249 N. W. 164 (1933). But d. Shawv
v. Cramton, 256 Mch. 293, 295, 239 N. W. 366, 367 (1931). In Naquin v. Texas Savings
& Real Estate Investment Ass'n, 95 Tex. 313, 67 S. W. 85 (1902), where the purchaser had
agreed to insure for the vendor's benefit, the vendor was held entitled to apply the
insurance money to restoring the damaged premises as against the purchaser's contention
that it should be applied on unmatured installments of the purchase price.
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the most satisfactory way of arranging insurance between vendor and
purchaser.253
A situation having considerable resemblance to that where premises
contracted to be sold are damaged by fire and the vendor collects insur-
ance arises where such premises are taken by public authority under the
power of eminent domain and the vendor receives compensation for the
taking. Unless it be held that the condemnation has rendered the
vendor's title unmarketable 25 4 or has violated a covenant to convey free
of incumbrances,255 the loss due to such condemnation is allocable on
the same basis as a loss due to fire or other casualty. If the burden of
loss is on the purchaser either from the time the contract was made or
because he has taken possession, he cannot recover his payments and
may be compelled to pay the full contract price although part"' or all"57
of the property has been taken by eminent domain. But there is no such
difficulty as is encountered in the insurance cases in regarding the com-
pensation paid by public authority as taking the place of the condemned
property.25 The purchaser is entitled to the compensation received by
the vendor,"' but the vendor may hold that compensation as security
for the payment by the purchaser of the contract price.2"' If the amount
paid as compensation exceeds the purchase price, the purchaser
profits;26 while if the entire property, is condemned for less than the
contract price, the loss falls upon him.2 2 On the other hand, if it be held
that the burden of loss is on the vendor at the time of the condemnation,
253. See Pound, supra note 164, at 828; RiCHAI=s, INSUIzAcE (4th ed. 1932) 341, n. 92,
Cf. 2 WmrLsToN, CONTACTS (1920) 1790 et seq.
254. As in Miller v. Calvin Phillips & Co., 44 Wash. 226, 87 Pac. 264 (1906), The
pendency of condemnation proceedings at the time the contract is made may render the
vendor's title unmarketable. Cavenaugh v. McLaughlin, 38 Minn. 83, 35 N. W. 576 (1887).
Cf. Note (1930) 67 A. .L. R. 1104.
255. As in Kares v. Covell, 180 Mass. 206, 62 N. E. 244 (1902); Johnston v. Callery,
173 Pa. 129, 33 Ad. 1036 (1896). See also Sanborn, J., dissenting, in Nixon v. Marr, 190
Fed. 913, 919 (C. C. A. 8th, 1911).
256. Nixon v. Marr, 190 Fed. 913 (C. C. A. 8th, 1911), (1912) 12 CoL. L. R v. 257;
Kuhn v. Freeman, 15 Kan. 423 (1875); Summers v. Midland Co., 167 Minn. 453, 209
N. W. 323 (1926), (1927) 25 MicH. L. REv. 297; Reife v. Osmers, 252 N. Y. 320, 169
N. E. 399 (1929), (1930) 39 YAIE: L. J. 916.
257. Gammon v. Blaisdell, 45 Kan. 221, 25 Pac. 580 (1891).
258. Cf. Cullen & Vaughn Co. v. Bender Co., 122 Ohio St. 82, 90, 170 N. E. 633, 635
(1930).
259. Nixon v. Marr, 190 Fed. 913, 917 (C. C. A. 8th, 1911); Stevenson v. Loehr, 57
IE. 509, 511 (1871); Summers v. Midland Co., 167 Minn. 453, 456, 209 N. W. 323, 324
(1927); Reife v. Osmers, 252 N. Y. 320, 324, 169 N. E. 399, 400 (1929).
260. Stevenson v. Loehr, 57 Ili. 509, 511 (1871); Summers v. Midland Co., 167 Minn.
453, 456, 209 N. W. 323, 324 (1927).
261. As in Stevenson v. Loehr, 57 Ill. 509, 512 (1871).
262. As in Gammon v. Blaisdell, 45 Kan. 221, 25 Pac. 580 (1891).
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the purchaser need not complete -O and the vendor is entitled to retain
the compensation.26 4 If the purchaser is entitled to partial specific
performance with an abatement of the purchase price, it would seem
that the amount of that abatement would not necessarily be the same
as the amount of the compensation the vendor has received in the
condemnation proceedings. 
0
Aside from the rather abortive English legislation with respect to
insurance as between vendor and purchaser and the indirect effect of
American statutes prescribing standard forms of insurance policies, the
law as to the burden of loss under land contracts and as to the practically
related problems of fire insurance upon (and compensation on condem-
nation of) the property contracted to be sold has developed up to the
present time without legislative aid or hindrance. Recently, however,
the attention of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws has been directed to these matters. At the recent forty-
fourth annual meeting of the Conference, August 21 to 27, 1934, c
there was submitted " 7 the first tentative draft of a proposed Uniform
Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act.2 s This proposed Act provides:
"Any contract hereafter made in this state for the purchase and sale of realty
shall be interpreted as imposing upon the parties the following rights and
duties, unless the contract expressly provides otherwise:
"(a) If before transfer of the legal title, or of the possession of the subject
matter of the contract, all or a material part thereof is accidentally destroyed
or is taken by eminent domain, the vendor cannot enforce the contract, and
the purchaser is entitled to recover any portion of the price that he has paid.
"(b) If after the transfer of the legal title, or of the possession of the subject
matter of the contract, all or any part thereof is accidentally destroyed or is
taken by eminent domain, the purchaser is not thereby relieved from a duty
to pay the price or entitled to recover any portion thereof that he has paid.
"(c) Where a vendor receives compensation from insurance or otherwise for
263. Ogren v. Inner Harbor Land Co., 83 Cal. App. 197, 256 Pac. 607 (1927); Kares v.
Covell, 180 Mass. 206, 62 N. E. 244 (1902); Note (1912) 12 Cor. L. REv. 257.
264. But where the condemnation proceedings were pending when the contract was
made and no express provision is made in the contract for the disposition of compenzation
awarded in those proceedings, the purchaser is entitled to the compensation amarded.
Security Co. v. Rice, 215 Cal. 263, 9 P. (2d) 817 (1932); Note (1933) 82 A. L. R. 1053.
265. Cf. note 238, supra. But see Cullen & Vaughn Co. v. Bender Co., 122 Ohio St.
82, 94, 170 N. E. 633, 637 (1930), where it is said that an optionee is entitled, upon
exercise of an option of purchase, to the compensation received by the optionor from the
condemnor in respect of the taking by eminent domain proceedings of part of the optioned
property.
266. At Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
267. By Professor Samuel Williston.
268. The Act was originally proposed as the "Uniform Vendor and Purchaser Act."
This was amended by the Conference in Committee of the Whole to "Uniform Vendor
and Purchaser Risk Act.'
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such destruction or taking, the purchaser shall be entitled to enforce the contract
with an abatement of the price to the extent of such compensation.
"(d) Where a purchaser receives compensation from insurance or otherwise
or such destruction or taking, the vendor shall be entitled either to have such
compensation applied to the payment of the price to the extent that is necessary
or, at the option of the purchaser, applied to the restoration of the subject
matter."
269
The proposed Act, it will be noted, proceeds on the theory that the
allocation of burden of loss and the distribution of insurance money or
compensation upon condemnation between vendor and purchaser is a
matter of contract between the parties, and enacts a rebuttable statutory
presumption applicable to all contracts made in the state. In the course
of consideration of the draft by the Conference, an attempt was made to
amend the proposed Act so as to apply not only to contracts made in the
state but also to contracts for the sale of land situated in the state.-" 0
This amendment was rejected, largely because it was thought to raise
difficult questions of conflict of laws. Certainly an attempt to base the
proposed statute on two divergent theories, (1) that it enacts a rule of
interpretation applicable to all contracts made within the state, (2) that
it enacts a rule of property applicable to all contracts as to land within
the state unless the parties contract themselves out of the rule, would
be highly anomalous. So far as the question of burden of loss is con-
cerned, much may be said in favor of the latter theory. Most lawyers
probably think of the rule as to "risk of loss" established by the decisions
in any jurisdiction as a rule of property law which may be abrogated by
express contract 271 rather than as a rule as to the interpretation of land
contracts. Certainly those jurisdictions which place the burden of loss
on the purchaser have proceeded on a property theory rather than on the
basis of implying a term in the contract which the parties have failed to
supply. If this view be taken regarding the nature of the rule, it seems
more logical to change the rule of property than to set up a statutory
presumption that the parties have contracted that the rule shall not
apply unless they expressly agree that it shall. On the other hand, it
seems difficult to deal with the distribution of insurance money except
on a contract theory, and the same may be said of the disposition of
compensation for the condemnation of property contracted to be sold.
269. Section 1, reprinted here, is the operative part of the Act. The remaining sections
are formal (short title, interpretation, effective date, etc). The text of Section 1 of the Act
as reprinted is taken from the mimeographed transcript of the proceedings of the Conference
sitting in Committee of the Whole on the consideration of the Act.
270. This amendment was proposed by Commissioner Karl N. Llewellyn.
271. Compare the "rules for ascertaining the intention of the parties" as to transfer
of title to chattels which prevail under the SALEs Acr, § 19, 1 U. L. A. (1931) 147, "unless
a different intention appears."
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The paragraphs of the proposed Act which deal with burden of loss
adopt the possession test advocated by Williston.272 The discussion of
these paragraphs by the Conference did not concern itself with the
relative merits of the various bases for the allocation of that burden which
courts have adopted and legal writers have argued for, but was confined
to minutiae of drafting. 7 3  The desirability of the substantive change
which the Act would make in the law of most of the states was taken for
granted rather than consciously demonstrated. Even though it be granted
arguendo that the change should appeal to all by reason of its inherent
reasonableness, 74 it may be doubted whether the Conference will not
have to make more articulate its reasons for proposing so sweeping a
change in the law of most American jurisdictions if it is to hope for
general adoption of its proposal by the various state legislatures. A
change of similarly sweeping character was proposed in the case of the
Uniform Written Obligations Acte7  with but indifferent successY0
Unless the Conference and the other proponents of the Uniform Vendor
and Purchaser Risk Act take further steps affirmatively to demonstrate
the desirability of the rather radical change proposed, that Act may
suffer a similar fate.
The provisions of the proposed Act as to the disposition of insurance
received by the parties to a land contract have the effect of adjusting
matters inter partes in substantially the same way as they would be
adjusted if the contract had provided for insurance "as interest may
appear.' 27 7 If insurance is paid to the vendor, the purchaser gets the
advantage of the insurance by way of abatement of the purchase pricey73
If insurance is paid to the purchaser, the vendor's security interest is
272. See notes 172 and 173, supra.
273. Thus, the Conference discussed deleting "expressly" from the fhrst paragraph of
the proposed Act; substituting a broader term which would include chattels real for the
term "realty" in that paragraph; substituting "without fault of either party" or "without
fault of the purchaser" for "accidentally" in paragraphs (a) and (b); clarifying the
language of paragraphs (a) and (b) as to when the burden of loss shifts from vendor to
purchaser; etc.
274. But cf. Pound, supra note 164, at 826, n. 68; Note (1931) 29 MicH. L. R.a,. 487,
489 et seq.
275. Recommended by the Conference in 1925. See HAmmoor, or TH N~rxo:;,n
CONrnE.,-NCE OF ComissioNzs oq U.iroRm STATE LAws (1925) 193-215, 303-316.
276. Up to 1933, this Act had been adopted in only two states-Pennsylvania and Utah.
HADUBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONMENCE OF COarnITSXorns 0N U.irORM STATE LW;S
(1933) 518.
277. Cf. note 253, supra.
278. The enactment of this provision would abolish the rule of Rayner v. Preston in the
small number of American jurisdictions where it appears to be accepted. Cf. note 237,
supra. There might, however, be difficulty because of the insurer's possible claim to
subrogation. Cf. notes 231, 246, supra.
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protected by the requirement that the insurance money be applied on the
unpaid purchase price or used in the restoration of the premises.27 9 The
Act thus proposes to do for all vendors and purchasers who do not con-
tract themselves out of it what most well-advised vendors and purchasers
now do for themselves by express contract. The problem of distributing
condemnation awards is handled in much the same way as it has been
handled by the courts without statutory guidance.28 °
It will be observed that the proposed Act does not purport to deal
with the rights and liabilities of the insurer. Upon consideration of the
Act by the Conference, an amendment was proposed2 81 which provided,
in substance, that where the vendor had insured prior to the making of
the contract of sale, such insurance should continue in favor of the
vendor 282 until expressly cancelled 28 or unless transferred to the pur-
chaser,2 4 and that, where the vendor received insurance money and the
purchase price of the property was abated accordingly, the insurer should
not be subrogated to the vendor's rights against the purchaser. "  It
was urged that such a provision was desirable to protect small purchasers
who took possession under usual forms of installment contracts and who
did not themselves insure. Considerable opposition to this amendment
developed, based principally on two grounds: (1) That it would raise
serious difficulties if applied, as it would have to be applied in order to
be of practical value, to policies in foreign insurance companies and to
policies written outside the state; (2) that an Act containing a provision
which modified statutory standard forms of insurance policies would
have little chance of adoption by the several state legislatures. " The
279. Cf. notes 249-252, supra.
280. Cf. notes 259-264, supra.
281. By Commissioner Llewellyn.
282. Subject, of course, to the provisions of the proposed Act as to the distribution of
the proceeds of such insurance between vendor and purchaser in the event of loss.
283. This would do away with the avoidance of insurance for "change of interest,
right or title" as a result of the contract of sale or possession thereunder. Cf. notes
217-225, supra.
284. If so transferred, insurance money received by the purchaser in the event of loss
would, unless otherwise agreed by the parties to the land contract, be distributed In ac-
cordance with the provisions of the proposed Act.
285. Cf. notes 231, 246, supra.
286. In discussing the proposed amendment, Commissioner E. E. Brossard, Chairman
of the Legislative Drafting Committee of the Conference, said: "If this Act Invades the
insurance field, it means that it will be adopted in almost no states at all. The standard
fire insurance policy of New York is in force in almost every jurisdiction in the United
States, and that standard policy in the law contradicts what we propose to say here; and
if you introduce this in the Legislature, the Insurance Commission of the state will proceed
to kill the bill. You are invading a field that means as a practical matter you can't get
this adopted in the states, and there is no use of calling it 'an Act to make unlform'a lavt In
th. various states' if you can't pass it anywhere. It would be going afield to meet disaster."
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amendment was finally withdrawn; but the substance of the proposal
appears worthy of further consideration. Such a statutory provision, if
generally adopted, would eliminate the unfortunate lack of uniformity in
the law as to the effect of a contract for the sale of land or possession
thereunder upon the continued validity of the vendor's insurance poli-
cies,T and would obviate a difficulty which might otherwise arise from
the provision of the proposed Act that the purchaser shall be entitled to
have the vendor's insurance applied upon the unpaid purchase price sS
Since, however, the question involved is primarily one of insurance law,
it would seem that it could best be dealt with by a uniform amendment
to the standard fire policy statutes. Perhaps such an amendment might,
with the concurrence of the National Convention of Insurance Com-
missioners, be proposed along with, but independently of, the contem-
plated Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act.
The Conference, after considering the proposed Act in Committee of
the Whole, decided that the matter should go over until its next meeting,
to be held beginning July 9, 1935. Prior to that meeting, the first
tentative draft of the Act is being considered by the Real Property
Section of the Conference as well as by the Commercial Acts Section
which originally proposed it. A revised draft, which will embody changes
made to meet minor objections to the Act as originally proposed, - will
be submitted at the next meeting of the Conference, and action may
perhaps be taken by the Conference at that time. If a Uniform Vendor
and Purchaser Risk Act in substantially the form of the tentative draft
is recommended by the Conference and generally adopted by the states,
it will result in the most general and thoroughgoing single change in the
law of equitable conversion by contract which has yet been made by
legislative action.
V
FORFEITURES UNDER INSTALLMENT CONTRACTS
The many and difficult problems raised by installment land contracts
where time is expressly made of the essence-90 are for the most part
outside the scope of this discussion; 2 ' but there is one matter involving
287. Cf. notes 217-225, 283, supra.
288. Cf. note 285, supra. 289. Cf. note 273, supra.
290. The suggestion of Lord Thurlow in WFilliams v. Thompson (Ch. 1782), stated in
NEWLAND, CONTRACTS WITIN THE JURISDCTIoN OP COURTS OF EQUITY (1821) 238, and
Gregson v. Riddle (Ch. 1784), stated id. at 239, that time cannot be made of the esmnce
of a land contract in equity even by express provision, has long since been repudiated.
See Seton v. Slade, 7 Ves. 265, 270 (Ch. 1802); 2 WILisTo.N;, Co!T-== (1920) 1632.




the doctrine of equitable conversion as applied to such contracts and
legislation with regard to them which it seems appropriate to consider.
This matter is, moreover, of large practical importance, especially in
view of the increasing tendency in many parts of the United States to
arrange the financing of land purchases on the basis of installment con-
tracts rather than on the basis of purchase-money mortgages. 02
Whether the doctrine of equitable conversion is applicable to contracts
for the sale of land where time has expressly been made of the essence
is a'disputed question on the authorities. Some courts have said that in
such a case there is a condition precedent to the vendor-purchaser rela-
tion, so that the purchaser cannot be regarded as equitable owner so
long as any part of the purchase money remains unpaid.20 3  It seems
preferable, however, to say that there is a mutually specifically enforce-
able contract from the beginning, subject to a condition of prompt
payment of future installments which, if given effect by the courts, will
put an end to the vendor-purchaser relation immediately upon default by
the purchaser and thus divest his equitable ownership. 0 4 It should be
immaterial, so far as equitable conversion is concerned, that the contract
in terms provides that prompt payment of each installment of the pur-
chase price shall be a "condition precedent" to any rights under the
contract, and contains a forfeiture clause. The condition of prompt
payment is one which operates to divest a relationship between the
parties which has in fact arisen by virtue of the contract. Calling it a
"condition precedent" does not require the courts to enforce it as such."0
What is really involved here is an attempt to induce the courts, by the use
of emphatic language, to enforce a forfeiture provision. This attempt
equity, looking at the substance of the transaction, should disregard.
If this analysis be accepted, it follows that the purchaser has an equit-
able property right amounting to substantial ownership, and this though
time is expressly of the essence, though prompt payment is stated to be
a condition precedent to any rights under the contract, and though the
contract contains a forfeiture clause. This equitable ownership of the
purchaser is subject to the security interest of the vendor, who is in a
292. Cf. REEP, SECOND MORTGAGES AND LAND CONTRACTS IN RFA- ESTATE FINANCING
(1928) 1, 160.
293. Commissioners of Douglas County v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 5 Kan. 615, 623 (1870);
Brown v. Thomas, 37 Kan. 282, 286, 15 Pac. 211, 213 (1887); Pickens v. Campbell, 104
Kan. 425, 179 Pac. 343 (1919); Schaefer v. E. F. Gregory Co., 112 Wash. 408, 413, 192
Pac. 968, 971 (1920).
294. Williams v. Haddock, 145 N. Y. 144, 39 N. E. 825 (1895); 1 PoMERaoY, op. cit.
supra note 164, at 680 n. It is of course true that, where time is of the essence, prompt
performance is a condition precedent to the vendor's duty to convey, but it Is not.
necessarily a condition precedent to the creation of the vendor-purchaser relation.
295. Cf. Barlow v. Williams, 16 Manitoba 164 (1906).
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position in substance like that of a mortgagee. When an attempt is
made by the vendor to enforce the forfeiture clause in the contract
because the purchaser has failed to pay an installment on time, the prob-
lem is not simply whether equity will allow the cancellation of a contract
as against one who is in default under it"0 but also whether equity will
enforce a forfeiture both of the purchaser's equitable interest and of
payments previously made in favor of one who has in substance only a
security interest in the property. In the very similar case of a purchase-
money mortgage, the answer is clear. The mortgagee may foreclose,
but he cannot forfeit the security without returning payments made less
his damages, while the mortgagor has a right of redemption until fore-
closed. No amount or sort of express provisions for forfeiture in the
bond and mortgage can change this result. - 7 In the case of a land
contract, while the contractual aspect of the case may well be regarded
to the extent of denying specific performance to the purchaser who is
in default under a clause making time of the essence, it would go directly
counter to the traditional attitude of equity toward penalties and for-
feitures29 to permit the vendor to retain payments made by the pur-
chaser over and above the vendor's actual or reasonably liquidated dam-
ages. As the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has forcibly
pointed out in the comparatively recent case of Steedinan v. Drinklep
the proper course for equity to pursue is to refuse specific performance
to the purchaser if the vendor objects, but in such case to allow the pur-
chaser to recover his payments less the vendor's damages resulting from
the purchaser's failure to carry out his contract. 00
The reasons which have led many if not most American courts to a
contrary conclusion30' are more easily comprehended than justified. For
one thing, the attention of the courts has ordinarily been directed rather
toward the question of whether the purchaser in default should be granted
specific performance than toward the quite different question of whether
payments already made should be forfeited. 0 2 Moreover, there has been
confusion as to whether the purchaser under a contract making time of
the essence gets an immediate equitable property right,^ 3 and an un-
critical assumption of the enforceability of contract provisions put in
the form of "conditions precedent" regardless of the fact that the en-
296. Cf. BodweU v. Bodwell, 66 Vt. 101, 104, 28 At. 870, 871 (1894).
297. See 3 Poaoy, op. cit. supra note 164, at § 1193.
298. See 5 HoLDswoRTH, HrSTOR Or ENGLI sH LAw (1924) 293 et seq.
299. [1916] 1 A. C. 275, (1916) 29 H.v. L. REv. 791.
300. But d. 2 Wn.mro,, CoNrvmcTs (1920) 1517.
301. See notes 313, 315, infra.
302. See, e.g., Heckard v. Sayre, 34 Ifl. 142, 149 (1864).




forcement of such provisions will result in forfeitures. 0 4  But the basic
reasons behind the prevailing American rule lie deeper than this. The
doctrine that equity will enforce forfeiture provisions in land contracts
where time is expressly made of the essence developed in this country
during the latter half of the nineteenth century,305 at a time when
extreme ideas as to "freedom of contract" were influencing American
judicial decisions in every field.306 It was a time when equity was
decadent,30 7 when laissez faire was almost an article of judicial faith,0 8
and when the courts were thinking in terms of free-willing individuals
entirely able to look after themselves rather than in terms either of
classical equity or of a socialized law taking a realistic account of
inequalities of economic position and bargaining power. The ecclesiasti-
cal chancellor who granted relief to a plaintiff who had not taken care
to follow the prescribed rules as to covenants because "Deus est pro-
curator fatuorum,"30 9 the classical chancellor who created the equity of
redemption in the face of the strict law3 10 and who said that "necessitous
men are not . . . free men,"'311 had given place to judges who regarded
individual freedom of contract as fundamental in any civilized system
of law and enforced the harshest of contract provisions without hesitation
or searching of conscience unless constrained by binding precedent to
relieve against them. The court of conscience had become a court
strictissimi juris. 12 In such an atmosphere, it was easy enough to put
aside the tradition that equity would not enforce a forfeiture except in
so far as that tradition had been embalmed in direct precedents, and to
develop a line of decisions holding that contracts for the sale of land
which expressly made time of the essence and provided for the forfeiture
304. See, e.g., Labelle v. O'Connor, 15 Ont. L. R. 519, 542 (1908); PomEROy, SPE=CIC
PaFoPaANcE or CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1926) § 379. There should be no such magic In the
words "condition precedent."
305. Compare Heckard v. Sayre, 34 Ill. 142 (1864) with Edgerton v. Peckham, 11
Paige 352 (N. Y. 1844).
306. See Pound, Liberty of Contract (1909) 18 YATx. L. J. 454. Cf. Jennings, Freedom
of Contract-Inquiries and Speculations (1934) 22 CA=IF. L. R.. 636.
307. See Pound, The Decadence of Equity (1905) 5 CoL. L. Rav. 20.
308. See note 306, supra. Cf. Holmes, J., dissenting, in Lochner v. New York, 198
U. S. 45, 75 (1905).
309. George Neville, Bishop of Exeter, L. C., in Y. B. Pasch. 8 EDW. IV, f. 4, pl, 11
(1467); see Vinogradoff, Reason and Conscience in Sixteenth-Century Jutrsprudence (1908)
24 L. Q. Ray. 373, 380.
310. See 5 HO-DSWORmi, op. cit. supra note 298, at 330.
311. Lord Northington, L. C., in Vernon v. Bethell, 2 Eden 110, 113 (Ch. 1762).
312. Cf. Buckley, J., in In re Telescriptor Syndicate, Ltd., [1903] 2 Ch. 174, 195: "This
Court is not a Court of conscience." For a very recent example of this tendency, see
Graf v. Hope Bldg. Corp., 254 N. Y. 1, 171 N. E. 884 (1930); and cf. the comment on that
case in (1930) 79 U. os' PA. L. Ray. 229, 231.
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of all payments theretofore made in the event of default would be en-
forced according to their literal terms,31 3 especially where prompt pay-
ment of all installments was made an express "condition precedent" to
the purchaser's rights under the contract. There has been some slight
tendency away from this nineteenth century doctrine in the last few
decades, 1 4 but it has become established law in many American states.311
In this situation, where courts of equity have tied their own hands by
a line of inequitable precedents, the case for corrective legislation seems
clear-and there has been some such legislation. To a considerable
extent, however, the courts have succeeded in depriving of effect the
statutes which have been enacted to compel them to do equity. The
broad provisions of the Field draft Civil Code,310 adopted in California,
Montana and North and South Dakota, authorizing relief against for-
feitures317 have been held in California to be inapplicable to land con-
tracts where time is of the essence. 318 Statutes providing for a period of
313. Some of these decisions have resulted in shocking hardship on the purdas--r.
See, e.g., Iowa Rr. Land Co. v. Mlickel, 41 Iowa 402 (1875); Heclard v. Sayre, 34 311.
142 (1864) ; Nelson Real Estate Agency v. Seeman, 147 Mlinn. 354, 180 N. W. 227 (1920) ;
Brown v. Ulrich, 48 Neb. 409, 67 N. W. 168 (1896); Doctorman v. Schroeder, 92 N. J. Eq.
676, 114 Atl. 810 (1921).
314. See, e.g., Lytle v. Scottish American Mortgage Co., 122 Ga. 458, 467, 50 S. E.
402, 406 (1905). There has also been a tendency on the part of some courts which
enforce forfeitures to avoid doing so in hard cases by finding a "waiver" of the forfeiture
by the vendor. As has aptly been said, "Strict doctrines as to forfeiture inevitably produce
loose doctrines as to 'waiver'." Pound, supra note 164, at 952.
315. The authorities are collected and ably discussed in Ballantine, Forfeiture for Bread
of Contract (1921) 5 Mfnu'. L. Ray. 329; Corbin, Right of a Defaulting Vendee to the
Restitution of Instalments Paid (1931) 40 YAr= L. J. 1013; Vanneman, Strict Foredosure
on Land Contracts (1930) 14 Mnm. L. REV. 342.
316. § 1831: "Whenever, by the terms of an obligation, a party thereto incurs a for-
feiture, or a loss in the nature of a forfeiture, by reason of his failure to comply with its
provisions, he may be relieved therefrom, upon making full compensation to the other
party, except in case of a grossly negligent, willful or fraudulent breach of duty." See
also § 1883, providing that "neither specific nor preventive relief can be granted to enforce
a ... penalty or forfeiture." CrviL CODE OF STATE OF NEw Yor RErORE Coisrznmr= By
TH CoarassIoNERs oF THE CODE (1865) 564, 583. This code, prepared by David Dudley
Field and A. W. Bradford, was never adopted in New York, but was adopted in California,
Mlontana and North and South Dakota. Cf. PouND, Ourzmrs or Lcr~unEs o. JunxsmunD-
E-CE (4th ed. 1928) 83.
317. CAL. CIv. CODE (Deering, 1931) §§ 3275, 3369; MoTNr. REV. CODE A m. (Choate,
1921) §§ 8658, 3710; N. D. Comp. LAws A.N. (1913) §§ 7138, 7188; S. D. Comm'. L.w"
(1929) §§ 1958, 2006.
318. Parsons v. Smilie, 97 Cal. 647, 654, 32 Pac. 702, 704 (1893); Glock v. Howard
& Wilson Colony Co., 123 Cal. 1, 55 Pac. 713 (1898); Collins v. Eksoozian, 61 Cal. App.
184, 196, 214 Pac. 670, 675 (1923) ; (1930) 18 CALX. L. Rxv. 6S1; Comment (1932) 20 id.
at 194. Mlontana appears to have taken a somewhat more liberal view. Cf. Surburban
Homes v. North, 50 Mont. 10, 145 Pac. 2 (1914). In South Dakota, these provisions, while
not restricted in their application to such an extent as in California, do not prevent
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grace to the purchaser in the termination of land contracts'10 have been
construed,2 contrary to what appears to have been the intent of the
legislature,321 as if enacted for the sole purpose of giving vendors an
effective remedy without the need of going through foreclosure proceed-
ings.322 In Canada, on the other hand, relatively simple legislation"2
has been surprisingly effective, 24 emphasizing that the difficulty in secur-
ing a similar result in this country has been caused primarily by the
courts. Recent moratorium legislation has in at least one instance in-
cluded land contracts3 25 and seems sustainable under the federal Consti-
forfeiture of payments where the vendor sues to quiet title against the contract or for
strict foreclosure. Pier v. Lee, 14 S. D. 600, 606, 86 N. W. 642, 643 (1901); Taylor v,
Martin, 51 S. D. 536, 215 N. W. 695 (1927). The North Dakota court has not yet
definitely settled the construction to be given to such provisions in that state. Cf. Bennett v.
Glaspell, 15 N. D. 239, 107 N. W. 45 (1906); Johnston Farm Investment Co. v. Huff, 52
N. D. 589, 204 N. W. 333 (1925). See, generally, Vanneman, supra note 315, at 353-358.
With regard to other legislation as to land contracts in North and South Dakota, see note
319, infra.
319. The Minnesota statute is typical. It provides: "When default is made In the
conditions of any contract for the conveyance of real estate or any interest therein, whereby
the vendor has the right to terminate the same, he may do so by serving upon the
purchaser . . . a notice specifying the conditions in which default has been made, and
stating that such contract will terminate thirty days after . . . such service unless prior
thereto the purchaser shall comply with such conditions and pay the costs of service ...
If within the time mentioned, the person served complies with such conditions and pays
the costs of service, the contract shall be thereby reinstated; but otherwise shall terminate."
MIn . STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 9576. A similar statute is in force in Iowa, IowA CoDE
(1931) §§ 12389-12394. In North Dakota, there is a statute having a like effect but
requiring one year's notice. N. D. Coai. LAws A~x. (1913) §§ 8119-8122, as amended by
N. D. Com,. LAws ANN., 1913-1925 (Supp. 1926) §§ 8122-8122a. In South Dakota, there
is a statute codifying a strict foreclosure procedure but empowering the court "to equitably
adjust the rights of all the parties." S. D. Comap. LAws (1929) §§ 2914-2917. This statute
has had little effect. Cf. Hickman v. Long, 34 S. D. 639, 150 N. W. 298 (1914); Scott v.
Hetland, 51 S. D. 303, 213 N. W. 732 (1927); Vanneman, supra note 315, at 365-367.
320. International Realty Co. v. Vanderpoel, 127 Minn. 89, 148 N. W. 895 (1914);
Nelson Real Estate Agency v. Seeman, 147 Minn. 354, 180 N. IV. 227 (1920); Note (1921)
5 MINN. L. REv. 466. The Iowa court has been less severe. See Waters v. Pearson, 163
Iowa 391, 144 N. W. 1026 (1914). But cf. Mintle v. Sylvester, 202 Iowa 1128, 211 N. W.
367 (1926) (with dissent on another point), discussed in Note (1927) 13 IowA L. REV. 93,
North Dakota, however, appears to have taken much the same view as Minnesota. Lander
& Co. v. Deemy, 46 N. D. 273, 176 N. W. 922 (1920) (with dissent). See, generally,
Vanneman, supra note 315, at 362-365.
321. Ballantine, supra note 315, at 351.
322. Vanneman, supra note 315, at 363-364.
323. ALBERTA REV. STAT. (1922) c. 72, § 35(h); SASK. REV. STAT. (1930) c. 86, §§ 2-3.
324. See Canadian Pacific Ry. v. Meadows, I Alberta L. R. 344 (1908) (with dissent as
to extent of relief given); Mortgage Co. of Canada v. Filer, 18 Alberta L. R. 367 (1922);
Provincial Securities Co. v. Gratias, 12 Sask. L. R. 155 (1919); Ballantine, supra note 315,
at 351, et seq.
325. Minn. Laws 1933, c. 422.
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tution on the same basis as similar legislation as to mortgageso =o But
the real need is for carefully drafted statutes, the effect of which the
courts will be unable to evade, and which will compel them to deal with
installment contracts for the sale of land on the same equitable principles
which they apply without hesitation in the case of transactions essentially
similar in economic substance but set up in the form of a conveyance on
credit with a mortgage back as security. 2 7 Such legislation would bring
about the result which should have been readied by the courts themselves
through a proper application of the theory of equitable conversion and
the principle of relief against forfeitures. This would seem to be a
matter which might appropriately engage the attention of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws or other appro-
priate body 28
VI
By WAY oF CONCLUSION
It remains to consider the significance and implications of the legis-
lative changes in the law of equitable conversion by contract which
have been the subject of this discussion. From a purely analytical stand-
point, they indicate mainly a shift in emphasis in this field from the
unwritten to the written law, with some modification of doctrine. Where
once we had a group of legal precepts developed logically from certain
basic theoretical conceptions to be found in the decisions of the courts,
we now have a somewhat different group of precepts which have been
supplied in part by the legislature. The analytical jurist must take
account of these changes and must work them into his system of the law
as it is. When, however, the law is looked at as an evolving social in-
stitution, the legislation in the field of equitable conversion has a larger
importance than this. The legislative changes which have been discussed
are collectively significant as one more indication of the shift from equity
326. See Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934), holding constitu-
tional Minn. Laws 1933, c. 339. Cf. W. B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U. S. 426,
432 (1934).
327. This would not necessarily result in treating the two situations exactly alike.
In the mortgage situation, the buyer has the land and is not seeking affrmative relief, so
that the only question is as to relief against forfeiture. In the land contract situation,
the buyer is seeking legal title when in default under his contract. While he should ba
relieved against forfeiture on analogy to the mortgage situation, there seems no comprlling
reason for allowing him to have specific performance if the seller objects. See Comment
(1922) 32 YALE L. J. 65. This is the result which the English courts have reached without
statutory aid. Steedman v. Drinkle, [1916) 1 A. C. 275, supra note 299. Compare In re
Dagenham (Thames) Dock Co., 8 Ch. App. 1022 (1873), and Kilmer v. British Columbia
Orchard Lands, Ltd., [1913] A. C. 319, where specific performance was granted to a
purchaser in default although time was expressly of the essence of the contract.
328. Cf. the preceding installment of this article (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 559, 563, 571.
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to legislation as the principal means of legal growth32'-of the increasing
supersession of the judge by the legislator in the shaping of the legal
order. To the teacher of law, who must consider both the analytical and
the evolutionist viewpoints, it must be apparent that in the field of
equitable conversion, as in other fields, he must increasingly concern
himself with statutes.10
The legislative changes which have been here reviewed will, however,
have perhaps the greatest significance for those of the bench and bar who
are concerned with making the law more effective in attaining, social
ends-for the lawyer as social engineer." In the domain of property
law, one desideratum is reasonable certainty, and in attaining certainty
the method of logical deduction by which the rules of equitable con-
version were developed would at least seem to have much to commend
it. But it must be recognized that no ideal state of certainty has in fact
been reached by this method;"' and, in any event, certainty at the expense
of justice, elegantia juris at the expense of practical wisdom, may come
too high. In modifying the logical structure of the law to meet the needs
of practical affairs and the ideals of justice of the time and place, legisla-
tion has the great advantage of laying down a rule for the future in a
specific situation without affecting vested rights and without disturbing
the certainty of existing law as applicable to other situations, in so far
as such certainty exists. In the particular field of the law here under
discussion, it has been possible to make numerous legislative changes
without abolishing entirely the doctrine of equitable conversion, which
still remains available as a legal tool.
There would seem to be no present necessity for a general legislative
overhauling of the law of equitable conversion by contract. Where the
rules which have been developed on the basis of the theory of conversion
operate unjustly, where they produce results which are inconsistent with
the economic and social ideals of the time, appropriate statutory changes
in particular rules should take care of the matter. There is need for
careful drafting of such statutes. Corrective legislation, while it may
be enacted piecemeal, should not be haphazard. But the time has hardly
come for the abolition of the doctrine of equitable conversion or for its
codification. Nor does it seem of essential importance that the law as to
329. Cf. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (10th ed. 1906) 29.
330. Cf. Simpson, The Use of Statutory Materials in the Teaching of Equity (1933)
21 GEO. L. J. 457.
331. Cf. PouND, INTERPRETATIox or LEGAL HSTOR" (1923) 152 et seq.
332. Cf. the conflicting lines of decisions on particular applications of the doctrine of
equitable conversion referred to in notes 164-180, 188-202, 237-238, 313-315, supra, and




those matters to which the doctrine relates shall be made uniform as
between the states. Equitable conversion is primarily a conception of
the law of real property. The matters to which it relates-descent and
distribution, dower and curtesy, rights of creditors against interests in
land held by their debtor, vendor and purchaser-are of peculiarly local
importance and character. Until an attempt is made to make uniform
the decedent estates statutes and the real property law of the several
states, there seems no necessity for making uniform the law of equitable
conversion; and such an attempt appears even more remote than codifica-
ti6n of real property law in the individual states. The recent proposal
of a Uniform Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act," 4 for example, may be
supported as a measure of law reform, provided one is convinced of the
superiority of the Act's solution of the problem of burden of loss as
between vendor and purchaser over the other solutions which the courts
have adopted; it seems difficult to justify the proposed statute as a
measure "to promote uniformity in state laws on ... [a subject] where
uniformity is deemed desirable and practicable." 30  But there is need
in every state for critical analysis of the existing legal rules which have
been developed on the basis of the conversion doctrine and for the
preparation and enactment, wherever appropriate, of wisely conceived and
carefully drafted corrective legislation. The legislative changes of the
past point the way to further conscious improvement in this important
comer of the law.
333. Cf. Fraser, The Unfortunate Status of Certain Factors of Real Property Law and
Suggested Remedies (1934) 20 A: B. A. J. 684.
334. See pp. 769-773, supra.
335. See notes 164-180, supra.
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Art. I, § 2, HANDBOOK oF TH NATIO.NAL Co.w nrncE or Conumsmxons o,; U:,io.
STATE LAWS (1933) 468.
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